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Real reform would necessitate a willingness to reappraise
core tenets of the Westminster model
In recent years Whitehall has seen a near continual sequence of government initiatives
aiming at its reform. Yet David Richards and Patrick Diamond argue that real reform would
necessitate a willingness to reappraise a number of the core tenets of the Westminster
model.
As another year ends and a new one rolls in, it is somewhat apposite to ref lect on the
launch of  another PASC inquiry into Whitehall which seeks to take stock of  the
Coalit ion’s Civil Service Reform Plan published in June last year. From Fulton onwards,
ostensibly Whitehall appears to have been in a state of  almost permanent revolution. The
list of  init iatives by various governments in the intervening years is exhaustive, but any
highlights programme would include: The Reorganisation of  Central Government;
Rayernism; FMI; Next Steps; Continuity and Change I and II; Modernising Government;
Ref orming Public Services; Transf orming Public Service and The Governance of  Britain.
It is theref ore of  lit t le surprise that the f irst question posed by this new PASC inquiry is
deceptively simple – is the Civil Service in need of  radical ref orm? Yet, scratch below the surf ace and the
answer to this small conundrum is by no means straightf orward. For in many ways, the modern history of
Civil Service ref orm can be characterized as Janus-f aced. Why? Overtime, all governments have adopted
a common def ault setting in their approach to this subject: on the one hand, a tendency to caricature the
Whitehall machine as something akin to a ‘Rolls Royce’; while on the other, deriding its culture and
organizational practices f or constraining ef f ective policy making, in terms of  f ormulation, implementation,
or both.
The current ref orms proposed by the Coalit ion appear litt le dif f erent. It is not clear whether ref orm is
pitched at Whitehall as a monolithic organization requiring wholesale change, or something targeted
more at specif ic parts of  the service. The language invoked throughout proclaims a programme of
‘radical’ ref orm, resurrecting the ‘TINA’ aphorism of  the 1980s: ‘this t ime there is no choice’ (Francis
Maude p.4). Yet, as Colin Talbot has noted in one of  his earlier blogs on this very theme,  the substance
of  the plan of f ers litt le more than a series of  rather piecemeal, of ten unrelated proposals, or as he
rather more pithily put it – Mostly Old Wine in Very Old, but Relabelled, Bottles.
Part of  the ambiguity ref lects an unwillingness to clarif y the role of  the bureaucracy in the modern world,
undertaking a realistic appraisal of  its capabilit ies. It is dif f icult to establish the case f or ref orm, where
there is a lack of  over-arching vision of  what the civil service is and does. The emphasis should be less
on what the civil servants already does well, managing upwards, and more on what is of ten
overlooked: the ability to effectively manage downwards in delivering policy.
There are evidently points of  good sense in the plan, notably a commitment to upgrading training and
development, improving inf ormation management and introducing a coherent digital strategy f or UK
government. There is some acknowledgement that a considerable amount of  Whitehall policy-making is
weak and inef f ectual. However, there are a number of  areas where the proposals may not lead to
benef icial changes and, indeed, could result in unintended consequences.
First, there is no overall vision about what the f uture role of  the state should look like. The data
published to support the ref orm plan emphasizes the long-term challenge of  f iscal sustainability, and the
need f or signif icant cuts in departmental expenditure up to 2015-16 to achieve the government’s
commitments on def icit reduction. There is also a recognition that the civil service will have to respond to
complex social and environmental challenges, in particular an ageing society and climate change. Yet the
plan f ails to articulate what sort of  role and capacity government should provide to help meet these
challenges. It approvingly notes that civil service employment now constitutes less than 2 per cent of
total UK employment, the lowest level since 1945. The reduction in civil service employment since 2010 is
greater in two years than that achieved between 1979 and 1990. But it also raises f undamental questions
about the long-term capacity and sustainability of  the civil service.
The recent policy ‘f iasco’ over the West Coast mainline f ranchise process draws such questions into
sharp f ocus. For example, it highlights wider concerns surrounding the policy-making capability within the
Department of  Transport (Df T) f ollowing a series of  departures among senior staf f . Similarly, the f ormer
Chancellor of  the Exchequer, Alistair Darling, alludes in his recent memoirs to the lack of  experience and
expertise in the Treasury which compromised the quality of  support and advice he received in navigating
a pathway through the 2008 f inancial crisis. The process of  ‘slimming-down’ has accelerated across
Whitehall since 2010. None of  these debates about the role and f unction of  the state are properly aired
within the civil service ref orm plan.
Second, the ref orm plan alights on particular national models without exploring the underlying tensions
and ambiguities involved in exporting ref orms f rom one country to another. Indeed, the Cabinet Of f ice
minister Francis Maude has gone on record in announcing that the government is particularly interested
in the ‘New Zealand’ model based on a contractual relationship between ministers and departmental chief
executives. The advantages of  the New Zealand system are that senior of f icials are publicly accountable
f or perf ormance, resolving the underlying tension in many ‘Westminster-based’ democracies between
whether ministers or civil servants are responsible f or operational decisions and delivery. There are,
however, a series of  ambiguities that emerge in the UK context. For example, such a model might
entrench the artif icial distinction between ‘policy-making’ and ‘implementation’. In clarif ying ministerial and
civil service accountability, there is a risk that policy-making and implementation will be prised even f urther
apart.
Third, the plans consider the role of  the civil service in its own right, without considering its wider
relationship to public services. The modern day civil service does not operate in isolation, delivering
policy in a hierarchical, top-down f ashion. The civil service ref orm plan acknowledges weaknesses
inherent in the current architecture of  Whitehall policy-making. However, there is still a tendency to treat
policy f ormulation as a linear process of  transmission f rom central government to local agencies and
actors. Yet scores of  ministers over the last thirty years have voiced their f rustration at pulling what they
regard as ‘rubber levers’, compounded by the f act that their control over institutions beyond the central
state is circumscribed.
Fourth, despite the obvious imperatives of  f iscal consolidation providing a clear window of  opportunity
f or change, more radical options f or Whitehall ref orm appear to be of f  the agenda. For example, a lack
of  ‘joined-up’ government and departmentalism has been a perennial concern in Whitehall since the
1940s. There is a case f or re-examining departmental boundaries and ‘silos’, re-organizing Whitehall
round a series of  ‘outcomes’ that weaken or even abolish departmental boundaries.
Elsewhere, the plan should be applauded f or advocating a shif t towards more open policy-making,
drawing on more ‘expert’ and ‘non-expert’, outsiders. Yet at the same time it is not willing to countenance
challenging the holy grail of  Whitehall’s modus operandi – the disclosure of  minister-civil discussions.
There is no evidence to suggest that such a move would curtail the willingness of  of f icials to speak truth
unto power. Indeed conversely, it might well have the oppose ef f ect, enhancing the quality of  of f icials’
crit ical engagement in the policy process knowing there is the spotlight of  public scrutiny. Here again, one
could f lag the events surrounding the West Coast Mainline as a case in point.
So, the short answer to PASC’s question of  whether or not Whitehall requires radical ref orm is then,
rather f rustratingly both yes and no. Yes, if  there is a real willingness to reappraise a number of  the core
tenets of  the Westminster model, but no, if  it  simply involves another bout of  graf ting ref orm onto a
settlement that has been hanging round f or f ar too long.  It is of  course not dif f icult to work out which
of  these two routes the current Coalit ion is heading down, despite its somewhat overblown rhetorical
claims.
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